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Karsai Krisztina 
Ius Puniendi of the European Union 
(Az Európai Unió ius puniendije)
I. What is Ius Puniendi?
From the very beginning1 of the discussion about European criminal law, thequestion of accepting or denying ‘European’ ius puniendi became the core
issue not only in academic debates but also on the level of politics and policymaking. 
The notion itself is a broad concept and comprises a bundle of (several)
competences in criminal law which are generally applied in domestic criminal law
(particularly in continental legal families),2 while others are determinative for the
framework of international criminal law3. In a domestic (national) context, ius
puniendi means the public power to punish:
– the power to choose: choice between values and interests which should be
protected (‘whether to punish’),
– the power to use criminal law: decision to use power to punish in order to protect
above-mentioned values or interests (‘why to punish’),
– the power to define crime and punishment in two aspects: on the one hand, the
decision about the threshold of protection (what is punishable behaviour and ‘normal’
behaviour); the decision about other prerequisites of punishment (age, justification,
excuse etc.) in close connection with the former (‘what to punish’); and, on the other
hand, decision about the limitations of punishment.
Tanszékvezető egyetemi docens, Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, Bün-
tetőjogi és Büntető Eljárásjogi Tanszék
1 JESCHECK, Hans Heinrich: Die Strafgewalt übernationaler Gemeinschaften. ZStW 1953. 496–518.
2 In particular see more at PACKER, Herbert: The Limits of Criminal Sanctions. Stanford University Press,
1968. 19–30.
3 The question of international ius puniendi is arisen in connection with international crimes, with the
universal jurisdiction in criminal matters, with the criminal responsibility of individuals upon inter-
national law and with the existence of the supranational criminal tribunals. See more at M. NYITRAI
Péter: Nemzetközi és európai büntetőjog, Osiris, 2006; BASSIOUNI, Cherif: International Criminal Law
I–III. Brill, 1999.
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– the power to be severe: decision about the severity of the punishment, choice
between (theoretically infinite4) possibilities of punishment (‘how to punish’),
– the power execute punishment: performance of punishment, i.e. the entire process
of penal execution. 
The justification of any criminal legal framework is the presumption that any
State disposes of a power of ius puniendi as part of the public power it exercises. The
fundamental principles of criminal law are enshrined in constitutions, which control
the States’ power by designing and enforcing criminal law. The scope and margin of
accepted restrictive principles diverges in modern criminal law systems globally, but
there are common values embodied in common or similar principles that can be
deducted from national criminal laws. In Europe, the principle-guided limits of
criminal law are more convergent due to the influence of the common constitutional
heritage of the states and to the regionally ‘unified’ development of fundamental
rights protection. 
On the international level, ius puniendi does not fully exist nor is entirely
acknowledged. It shall be underlined that ius puniendi on the international level is
born by the partial transfer of States’ power to international communities or bodies.
If we look for ius puniendi on the EU-level, no doubt, we will find splits
(“horcruxes”5) transferred from MS to the European Union thus demonstrating
a ‘European’ character. The questions to be answered are the following in this regard:
1) Does this new character change the nature of ius puniendi? 2) Are the principle-
guided limits of domestic ius puniendi valid – even partially – on the European level
as well? 3) Are the more or less comparable criminal law principles of EU MS subject
to a hidden unification process due to the Europeanization?  
Karsai Krisztina
4 International human rights protection and the respective constitutional requirements limit this „infinity”
obviously.
5 In the famous bestseller series by J. K. ROWLING (Harry Potter), the horcrux is a magical object used
to store a part of a person’s soul. The soul is split by magical methods and these splits can be placed
in any normal object. The owner of the horcrux can be resurrected from a split of his/her soul in case
his/her body dies.
118
Lorincz_Tanulmanyok-I_:1.korr. 2014.04.28. 15:00 Page 118
II. The Hunt for “Horcruxes”
Clear criminal law competences are nowhere to be found in the text of the Founding
Treaties of the European Community6: the first inference to ‘something criminal’
only appeared in Article K.1 of the 1992 Treaty on European Union above, which was
not (even partial) ius puniendi in terms of criminal law but a competence of the newly
established EU to commence joint action in the field of criminal law (exceeding the
former limits of national combat against crime).
This explicit ius puniendi as described it by this study thus was in fact absent.
However, the development of the enforcement of Community law gave rise to wide-
range academic debate on the justification of rules laid down by several directives
or regulations of the Commission and the Council which aimed at applying necessary
sanctions against entities (natural persons or legal bodies) infringing Community
law on the level of the respective national (domestic) legal orders. Said academic
discourse focused on the question whether the requisite sanctions shall be criminal
or the MS has discretion to decide whether to apply different punitive measures.
Moreover, there was broad consensus in academic circles on the fact that many
secondary legal acts contain the obligation to sanction via domestic criminal law,
which would have meant that the secondary legislation in question practically uses
some kind of ius puniendi when it obliges the MS to punish the infringement of EC-
law by her criminal law framework. In my view, these opinions were not sufficiently
coherent and failed to recognize the true (legal) nature of ius puniendi. Because the
texts of these norms were permissive without exception, hence the transfer of the
respective split of national ius puniendi could not have been granted. Today, this
question not only has a new accent but also a new legal basis; therefore, new
perspectives unfold with respect to the splitting and transfer of ius puniendi to the
European level (discussed in detail below).
In case of other types of EC-regulations,7 questions might arise from the
following point of view. There were/are rules allowing the Commission to impose
sanctions against subjects of Community law (particularly for infringing European
competition or subsidy law). These sanctions were highly burdensome thus raising
the attention of academic circles and some scholars argued that the dividing line must
Ius Puniendi of the European Union 
119
6 At this point, I do not discuss the special provisions of the Treaty on EURATOM (Article 194 para-
graph 1) and the Statute of ECJ (Article 30).
7 E.g. Council Regulation (EEC) 17/62 then replaced by the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules of competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty [OJ L 1, 4.1.2003 1–25].
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be drawn between particularly disadvantageous (financial) sanctions of an EC
authority (imposed as an administrative sanction) and deterrent criminal (financial)
sanctions. Due to these academic debates and the jurisdiction of the ECJ,8 the
development of the non-criminal, sanctioning system within the Community took
a U-turn towards a principle-guided direction: the general principles of Community
law appeared within its framework. Even with this turn of events, ius puniendi was
not clearly accepted on the European level – irrespective of what aspects thereof
were brought into question beforehand. 
However, legal integration in the European Union involves a duty (on the part of
national bodies, authorities and courts) to enforce Community law.9 This obligation
(including the application of community law on the one hand and the interpretation
of national criminal law in accordance with community law on the other) is binding
on national criminal courts as well.10 The apparent interference between community
law11 and national criminal law results in excluding criminal liability in a number of
cases: the courts demonstrate a tendency to overwrite the ius puniendi of the national
legislator by interpreting national law differently (in accordance with EU law), thus
enforcing – in part – such values that are not inherently present in the body of law
governing domestic procedures. This achievement of European legal integration does
not constitute the transfer of ius puniendi in a direct manner only seems like one in
its legal consequences; therefore, it is not a real split of national ius puniendi. It
seems to be a hidden ‘negative’ form of ius puniendi for the Community, a de facto
‘ius non puniendi’ because of the legal possibility to render certain conduct not
punishable by activating the community law. This, however, is only the consequence
of legal development pursuant to the loyalty principle (and the primacy doctrine),
where the sole existence of comparable legal consequences does not amount to
Karsai Krisztina
8 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and others / Bundeskartellamt, 13 February 1969; 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma NV
/ Commission 15. February 1970; 44/69 Buchler & Co. / Commission; 45/69 Boehringer Mannheim
GmBH / Commission, 15. July 1970; 7/72 Boehringer Mannheim GmBH / Commission, 14 De-
cember 1972 (Boehringer II.); 154/78 S.P.A. Ferriere Valsabbia and others / Commission, 18 March
1980; 188/82 Thyssen Aktiengesellschaft / Commission, 16 November 1983; C-240/90 Germany /
Commission 27 October 1992
9 According to Article 4 paragraph 3 TFEU (ex Article 10 TEC or ex Article 5 TEEC) this is to be un-
derstood as a principle of loyalty. See more VON BOGDANDY, Armin: Neither an International Or-
ganisation nor a Nation State: the EU as a Supranational Federation. In The Oxford Handbook of the
European Union (Eds JONES, Erik – MENON, Anand – WEATHERILL, Stephen) Oxford University
Press, 2012 770–771.
10 See the analysis: BAKER, Estella: Taking European Criminal Law Seriously. Common Law Review
1998. 361–380.
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a latent transfer of the decision on ‘what to punish’ under the ‘power to define’
mentioned above.
The eventual acceptance of any ‘ius non puniendi’ might justify Community
decisions on the question ‘whether to punish’, i.e. it would require a transfer of
certain aspects of MS power to punish. This is, however, lacking here. The EC
legislator was willing to regulate economic issues only by not penalizing certain
types of conduct within the territory of the MS, and did this acting within the clear
competence patterns transferred to the EC/ECC. In other words, the Community
legislator did not wish to decide on the question ‘whether to punish’ or not.
Meanwhile, it became clear at that time that the Union (Community) does need
to make arrangements to shield its own interests, the protection of which could not
be efficiently provided and realized by the MS. Hence, the need for supranational
regulation finally became unquestionable. However, the overall (criminal law)
protection throughout Europe was not realised on a truly supranational level;
therefore, other means were introduced to fill in the gaps. Protections for the
financial interests of the Community (Union) by criminal law were established by
a multilateral convention of the MS12 which called for and set forth an obligation for
the contracting parties (MS) to criminalize such conduct. Said criminalization could
only have taken place following ratification or signature, in harmony with the
established rules of ‘traditional’ international law.
Not even the modifications introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam did establish
new competences of ius puniendi, albeit they made available an abstract power to
punish in the form of framework decisions, aimed at the approximation of different
MS laws in harmony with Article 34 paragraph 2 Nr b of TEU, as read together with
Articles 29 and 31.
Altogether, doubts were eliminated: third pillar legislation was entitled to decide
on questions of criminal law as provided by the split ius puniendi of the MS. In
examining the elements of ius puniendi, it can be stated that they are mainly
transferred to the third pillar in creating the possibility for legislation through FD.
The elements of the ‘powers to choose and to use’ (described above) were
partially ensured by the possibility to take measures by the Council in the third pillar:
Ius Puniendi of the European Union 
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11 KARSAI Krisztina: Az európai büntetőjogi integráció alapkérdései (KJK-Kerszöv 2004)
12 With the convention, the European Union aimed at combatting fraud affecting its expenditures and
revenues by taking appropriate criminal measures, such as the criminalisation of fraud, the imposi-
tion of criminal penalties, the establishment of criminal liability for business owners and operators,
and creating efficient rules of jurisdiction. Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention
on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests. OJ C 316, 27.11.1995 48–57
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the Council decided about the legislative use of FD for protection or combat against
certain forms of criminality and also about the further scope of FD, namely about the
use of national criminal laws to support the previous objective (use the punishing
power of the MS as well). The approximation of rules on constituent elements of
criminal acts shelters a limited power to define; the approximation of norms shall
always imply changes in case where the subject of approximation does not fit into
the ideal picture (in this case, if the national criminal laws did not ensure the intended
level of protection for the preferred values). These elements of ius puniendi are only
transferred to the European level to a limited extent, because the third pillar legislator
could not justify reactions for any kind of criminality with triggering the approxi -
mation of criminal laws, but only in specific cases. The decision about the severity
of punishment, the choice between modalities of punishment (‘how to punish’) is
also transferred to a limited extent if the FDs, at all, set a minimum or maximum
range for imprisonment but simultaneously do not create comprehensive penitentiary
frameworks through these legal measures. The power to define punishment and the
power to execute said punishment are not conferred to the third pillar; they remain
in the power of the MS.
With time, the signs of change were detected, as PEERS mentioned, the “infiltra -
tion” has begun. “The first pillar principles began to infiltrate the third pillar in
particular as regards indirect effect, the scope of the court’s jurisdiction and the auto -
nomous interpretation of third pillar measures.”13 It should be admitted that the power
to use criminal law received an important role in the debate on (ex) Article 42 of the
TEU, on the ‘passerelle’ clause. Relevant debate centred upon the question whether
the Community has such values or interests, the protection (or enforcement) of which
requires the use of third pillar measures as well, e.g. the use of the split ius puniendi
in order to achieve clear Community objectives. Nonetheless, the European legislator
did not try to prematurely enforce the use of this clause and found a proper ‘golden
mean’ to create an enhanced level of protection for preferred Community interests:
e.g. in case of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, the Council issued a directive
(2002)14 distinguishing legal and illegal behaviour in terms of Community law (as
administrative law), at the same time a framework decision activated the criminal
laws of the MS15 in order to punish the most serious modalities of behaviour rendered
illegal by afore-said Council directive.
Karsai Krisztina
13 PEERS, Steve: EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Non-Civil). In The Evolution of EU Law (eds: Paul
Craig – Gráinne de Búrca). Oxford University Press, 2011. 277.
14 Council directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry,
transit and residence, OJ L 328, 5.12.2002, 17–18.
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Anyway, theoretic debates on (ex) Article 42 of the TEU remained on the
agenda. The Commission then contributed an added value to this ‘maturing process’
because, on 10th May 2006, it published that the ‘passerelle’ clause shall be applied
in order to enable police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, so this field
could be dealt with under the EC Treaty, with consequentially increased roles for the
organs of the Community. As the Commission stated “action and accountability in
some areas of policy making are hindered by the current decision making
arrangements, which lead to deadlock and lack of proper democratic scrutiny.
Existing Treaty provisions (Articles 42 of the Treaty on European Union and 67(2)
of the Treaty establishing the European Community) allow for changes to these
arrangements, which would improve decision taking in the Council and allow proper
democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament; and the enhancement of the role
of the Court of Justice.”16
In the debates beforehand, the doubtful justification of the eventual entitlement
(power) of the Community legislator to execute (even limited) ius puniendi was the
main issue. It was questioned from the point of view focusing on national criminal
law, of course. However, the debates were then suddenly frozen: following the afore-
mentioned political communication of the Commission, the ECJ itself took the first
step in a new direction (Case C–176/03 Commission v Council) which already
entailed heavy legal consequences. Obviously, both of these steps (although of
different character) already showed the future path in terms of a possible expansion
of ius puniendi on the level of the Treaties.
Expectations, however, were low as to this vision of the future, although the
decision in question was enthusiastically welcomed by the Commission; the Council
and MS were - what a surprise! – less charmed by the ruling, and were unwilling to
accept its broad reach. Academic reactions were also critical;17 many authors made
reference to the birth of the Leviathan or the ‘Brussels Octopus’.18 As the British Lords
summarised it accurately: “Until September 2005 it was commonly understood that
the Treaty establishing the European Community conferred no power to define
criminal offences or prescribe criminal sanctions. The extent of the European Union’s
Ius Puniendi of the European Union 
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15 Council framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328,
5.12.2002, 1–3.
16 Communication from the Commission to the European Council: A citizen’s agenda: delivering
results for Europe. Brussels, 10.5.2006, COM(2006) 211 final, 6.
17 CRAIG Paul – DE BÚRCA Gráinne: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press 2011)
18 HEFENDEHL Roland: „Europäischer Umweltschutz: Demokratiespritze für Europa oder Brüsseler
Putsch?” Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 2007/4 167. („Brüsseler Krake”)
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legislative competence in relation to criminal law and procedure was generally
considered to be limited to the ‘Third Pillar’. That Member States, or at least
a majority of them, had seemingly been labouring under a misapprehension as to what
they had agreed in the Treaties, and on what basis they had recently settled the text of
the Constitutional Treaty, was revealed when, on 13 September 2005, the European
Court of Justice (the Court) handed down its judgment in Case C–176/03.”19
In this case, the Court clarified the distribution of powers in criminal matters
between the first and third pillars on the basis of converging legislative power
between a directive and a framework decision on protecting the environment by the
criminal law. The Court asked and answered the question very clearly whether
competences in criminal law can be attributed to the Community. The Court said
yes, but without activating Article 42 TEU. Their conclusion amounted to a true –
substantial – extension, introduction of a similar split ius puniendi into first pillar
legislation as the one that already transpired in the third pillar. However, this
extension was (legislative procedure, sanctions in case of non-implementation,
deadlines etc.) quite different in its legal consequences than that in the third pillar,
although, supranational (limited) ius puniendi was thereby acknowledged by the
Court in favour of the Community.20
The judgement opened new margins of interpretation for the competence of the
Community which were applied as part of the initiative of the Commission to replace
framework decisions with new directives.21 Two directives22 were enacted in that
Karsai Krisztina
19 The Criminal Law Competence of the European Community. Report with Evidence. House of
Lords, European Union Committee, 42nd Report of Session 2005–06, 7.
20 C-176/03 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union 13 Septem-
ber 2005 [2005] ECR I-7879, paragraphs 41–42, 47–48, 51–53: “In this regard, while it is true that,
as a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within the Commu-
nity’s competence, this does not, however, prevent the Community legislature, when the application
of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is
an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences, from taking measures which re-
late to the criminal law of the Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that the
rules which it lays down on environmental protection are fully effective. That competence of the Com-
munity legislature in relation to the implementation of environmental policy cannot be called into
question by the fact that Articles 135 EC and 280(4) EC reserve to the Member States, in the spheres
of customs cooperation and the protection of the Community’s financial interests respectively, the
application of national criminal law and the administration of justice.”
21 The Parliament expressed almost the same opinion: Implications of Case C-176/03. European Par-
liament resolution on the consequences of the judgment of the Court of 13 September 2005 (C-176/03
Commission v Council) 2006/2007(INI).
22 Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on ship-
source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, Official Journal L 255,
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way (already based on the TEC), thus Article 42 TEU is no longer considered to
serve as legal basis for the renewed protections. Avoiding the use of the ‘passerelle’
clause entails that not only the ECJ but also the European legislator saw the
competence to enact directives relevant to criminal law. Even if it was an express or
explicit power conveyed by the original wording of the Treaties. The development
of the law reached a new phase by this new interpretation, and an apparent lack of
resistance from MS prepared the next step taken by the reforms of the Union and the
new Treaties.
Resolving the opaque nature of the limited ius puniendi discovered in the text of
the TEC by the Court, the TFEU (in force since 1.12.2009) brings clarity and
provides explicit competences in the field of criminal law. It abolishes the three pillar
structure and unifies the legal framework of EU law by ‘harmonising’ the different
legal norms and by building a common framework (legislative procedures, forms of
legal acts, judicial remedies etc.) for every policy. The AFSJ (are of freedom, security
and justice) is one of the shared competences of the Union, MS are entitled to invoke
their competences only to the extent that the Union has not exercised or has decided
to cease to exercise its competence. This looks like automatic pre-emption of MS
action where the Union has exercised its competence, with the consequence that the
amount of shared power held by the MS will diminish over time. CRAIG and
DE BÚRCA suggested furthermore, that “there is truth in this, subject to the following
qualifications. MS will lose their competence within the regime of shared power
only to the extent that the Union has exercised ’its’ competence. Precisely what the
EU’s competence is within these areas can, be divined only by considering the detailed
provisions in a particular area. The pre-emption of MS action will moreover occur
only ’to the extent” that the EU has exercised its competence in the relevant area.
There are different ways in which the EU can intervene in a particular area. The EU
may choose to make uniform regulations, it may harmonise national laws, it may
engage in minimum harmonisation or it may impose requirements of mutual
recognition. The scope for any MS action will depend on which regulatory technique
is used by the EU.”23
Ius Puniendi of the European Union 
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30.9.2005. 11–21; Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 No-
vember 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, Official Journal L 328,
6.12.2008. 28–37.
23 CRAIG – DE BÚRCA (fn 17) 933.
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III. Splits of Ius Puniendi in the TFEU
There are several Articles which express ius puniendi on the European level, but
there are quite substantial differences between the rules concerning the limits of ius
puniendi. Putting it simply, only splits of ius puniendi are transferred to the Union;
therefore, we cannot come to a conclusion that a general European ius puniendi
would exist. Three provisions of TFEU shall be mentioned as relevant to this
argument: Articles 82-83 and 325. Articles 82, 83 define shared competences
regarding AFSJ in the scope of judicial cooperation, but Article 325 is pertinent to
the financial provisions of TFEU; it sets forth the competence to enact the necessary
measures (which shall “act as a deterrent”) in the fields of prevention of and fight
against fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the Union’s financial interests.
Paragraph 4 Article 325 provides for the legislative procedure to adopt the necessary
measures with a view on affording effective and equivalent protection. It also
provides for a legal basis to legislate in relation to fraud and any other illegal
activities affecting the Union’s financial interests in the fields of the prevention and
the fight against fraud. The term fraud must in this context be understood in a broad
sense, including certain fraud-related criminal offences. The argument can be made
that this norm entitles the EU to enact provisions with criminal law content.24
Article 325 is a ”direct descendant” of the afore-mentioned convention on the
protection of the financial interests of the Community: the missing signatures and the
gentle unwillingness of the MS to ratify or apply it without delay made it indisputable
that a new way shall be found for the effective protection of the supranational
interests of the Union. Without analysing the entire discussion process, it is
noteworthy that the new Article of TFEU already establishes this new way of
enforcing interests.
Paragraph 4 contains the most exhaustive ius puniendi at the European level
because it entitles the legislator of the Union to adopt necessary measures in order
to fight fraud.25 Only the ‘power to execute’ is absent from among the elements of
the theoretic structure of ius puniendi, the Union itself does not perform penal
procedures or execution. However, in the future, if the establishment of the European
Karsai Krisztina
24 See also BÖSE, Martin: „Die Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Vertrag von Lissabon
und ihre Bedeutung für die Europäisierung des Strafrechts” Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechts-
dogmatik 2010/2. 88.
25 There is already a proposal for a directive on agenda: Proposal for a Directive of the European Par-
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126
Lorincz_Tanulmanyok-I_:1.korr. 2014.04.26. 13:53 Page 126
Public Prosecutor26 as such will become a reality, the last ‘horcrux’ will also be
transferred.
It is important to note at this point that the legislator has the right to issue any
legal act (if the general requirements are met), ius puniendi is not limited, the
legislator has the liberty to choose between directives and regulations as well. No
doubt, the legal nature of a regulation with criminal law content might be similar to
the ones enacted under domestic (MS) criminal law – that is what is really
a (r)evolutionary development. Under Paragraph 1, another entitlement of the Union
is codified, one to counter fraud, albeit it might be construed as an effectively weak
competence due to the parallel presence of the MS as actor.
Article 83 paragraph 1 expresses ius puniendi in form of the ‘power to define’.
The second sentence covers the ‘power to use’, while the third sentence the general
‘power to choose’.
It is an important difference between the second and third sentences, from the
European point of view, that the legislative procedure covered is not the same, and
the procedural rules are not relevant for identifying ius puniendi as such. This Article
is a true successor of the previously analysed rules within the third pillar.
The next rule to discuss is the rule fixing the broad concept of Community
competences initially originating from judicial interpretation attributing them
constitutional effect. According to Article 83 paragraph 2 MS criminal law can be
invoked to enforce EU policies.
In this case, the ‘powers to choose’ and the decision itself to activate criminal law
belong to the Council. The Council disposes of the most important splits of ius
puniendi over this core competence as well. The emergency brake rule introduced
under paragraph 3 is a compromise easing the obstruction by MS but it fits perfectly
into the “step by step protocol” of developing European criminal law.
IV. Summary
Concluding the argumentation on ius puniendi, I would like to emphasise that real
ius puniendi now exists on the level of the European Union; nevertheless, it is limited
and only some elements of that have been actually transferred.
In the sense of domestic criminal doctrine, this is not full ius puniendi, due to the
afore-mentioned partial transfer, but the legal possibility of the Union’s legislator to
Ius Puniendi of the European Union 
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decide on criminal law well within its rights (legal capacity) represents the true
progress of legal development along with the fact that it is very important for the
EU to be able to have its voice heard on criminal law issues as well.
Karsai Krisztina
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